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**Explaining Voting Behaviour on the Six-Pack  
Legislative Package in the European Parliament**

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# Outline

1. Background
2. Voting Behaviour of MEPs
3. Data
4. Variables
5. Results
6. Conclusion




# 1. Background

- Only limited research relates to the role of the **European Parliament** in the approval of anti-crisis measures.
- The new sanction mechanism of **RQMV** undermines the autonomy of national fiscal policies and empowers the Commission.
- Do MEPs vote along with **ideological preferences or national affiliations**?



# 2. Voting Behaviour of MEPs


- What determines MEP votes?
  - (1) MEPs ideological preferences
  - (2) National Party policy preferences
  - (3) National Economic Interests
  - (4) Public opinion in member states (?)
  - (5) Political Groups policy preferences



# 3. Data

(1) 11 Amendment roll-call votes

(2) 6 Resolution roll-call votes



# 4. Variables

- **Dependent variable**


(1) Support for committee's position in the 11 Amendment roll-call votes.

(2) Support for final text in the 6 Resolution roll-call votes.



# 4. Variables

- Independent variable




# (1) MEPs ideological preferences

- Left-right

**NOMINATE 1**

- Anti-/Pro- EU

**NOMINATE 2**





## (2) National Party policy preferences

- National party in government/opposition

(1) **NP Gov 23 June 2011**

(2) **NP Gov 28 Sep 2011**



- National party manifestos in 2009 EP election

(1) **NP Pro Commission**

(2) **NP Pro Eco Orthodoxy**

(3) **NP Pro Trans Power EU**



# (3) National Economic Interests

- MS voting power in Council

## Council Voting Weight

- MS fiscal situation

(1) Gov Current Account GDP

(2) Gov Gross Debt GDP

- MS Euro membership

## Euro Member 2011

- MS contribution to EFSF

## EFSF Contribution



## (4) Public opinion in member states

- Public trust in the Commission

**EB Pro Commission**

- Public support for deficit reduction

**EB Pro Deficit Reduction**



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# (5) Political Groups policy preferences

- EP political groups as dummy variable



# Take each MEP as a unit



Keller, Franziska  
MEP



	Independent Variables	value	data
<b>1. Ideology</b>	1-1 NOMINATE 1	-0.468	
	1-2 NOMINATE 2	-0.884	
<b>2. National Party</b>	2-1 NP Gov 23 06 2011	0	
	2-2 NP Gov 28 09 2011	0	
	2-3 NP Pro Commission	0.24	
	2-4 NP Pro Eco Orthodoxy	0.20	
	2-5 NP Pro Trans Power EU	0	
<b>3. National Economic Interest</b>	3-1 Council Voting Weight	29	
	3-2 Gov Current Account GDP	5.8	
	3-3 Gov Gross Debt GDP	80.3	
	3-4 Euro Member 2011	1	
	3-5 EFSF Contribution	29.07	
<b>4. Public Opinion</b>	4-1 EB Pro Commission	33	
	4-2 EB Pro Deficit Reduction	87	
<b>5. Political Groups</b>	5 EFG	Greens/EFA	

# 5. Results

(1) 11 Amendment roll-call votes

$p < 0.01$

**NOMINATE 1**

**NOMINATE 2**

**NP Gov 23 June 2011**

**EB Pro Commission**

(2) 6 Resolution roll-call votes

$p < 0.01$

**NOMINATE 1**


**NOMINATE 2**

**NP Gov 28 Sep 2011**


**NP Pro Commission**

**Gov Current Account GDP**

# EB Pro Commission




# Gov Current Account GDP







# 6. Conclusion





# Euro crisis



# Legislative Politics



# Legislative Politics



# Public Opinion



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Thanks for your attention